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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, refugees poured across international borders in record
numbers.1 Yet, as the horrific pictures from Myanmar, Syria, and
Somalia demonstrate, escaping from the injustice and economic
hardships imposed by failed states remains extremely difficult.
Refugees must take enormous personal risks to find safe havens, often
while leaving behind beloved family members and vibrant social
networks. Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati’s Article, A Market for
Sovereign Control, provides an opportunity to reconsider how best to
improve the lives of individuals stuck in poorly governed areas and also
to think more broadly about how to encourage good government in
other countries.2 These are vital questions because, as Blocher and
Gulati observe, the stakes are so high.3 People and nations continue to
fight (and die) to protect territory, cross borders, and alter
geographies.4

Copyright © 2017 Stephen Clowney.
† Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law.
1. “The Syrian refugee crisis is the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War.” E.
Tendayi Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect Refugees, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 687, 688 (2015). Many European countries are processing record numbers of refugees. See
Madison Park, Europe Received Record-Breaking 1.3 Million Asylum Applications in 2015,
CNN (Aug. 3, 2016, 7:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/03/europe/europe-record-refugees
[https://perma.cc/G7ME-N96G].
2. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797, 799–
800 (2017).
3. Id. at 799.
4. Id.
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Blocher and Gulati’s basic insight is that it is too hard for
populations who feel ill-served by their countries to exit.5 Thus, rather
than waiting for oppressed people to scrape their way into countries
with better governance, Blocher and Gulati argue in favor of bringing
better governance to oppressed people. They would accomplish this by
making international borders less sacred and easier to change.6
Specifically, they propose that a nation’s control over its territory
should become subject to a liability rule rather than a property rule if
it discriminates against one of its constituent regions.7 Under Blocher
and Gulati’s proposal, a nation that denies equal treatment to a local
area would lose the ability to prevent secession. The disfavored region
could elect to strike out on its own or join up with a friendlier
neighboring country. However, the authors also insist that
governments receive compensation for their lost land—compensation
that would be set by a global “market” for sovereign territory.8
This is bold, inventive work. Blocher and Gulati’s ideas make
three enormous contributions to scholarship on sovereignty. First, the
authors illuminate a glaring hole in modern international law: there is
currently no sound mechanism to help regions that are substantially
underserved by their parent nation, but not quite oppressed. Second,
the authors articulate a novel way to improve the lives of people in
regions surrounded by the “wrong” border. Their proposal is truly
elegant. Rather than relying on creaky international institutions or UN
peacekeepers for assistance, Blocher and Gulati want to harness the
power of markets and self-interested competition to improve the lives
of the politically powerless. Almost all previous reform efforts have
focused on public-law solutions rather than private-law mechanisms.
Finally, Blocher and Gulati show that their market for sovereignty can
encourage the spread of good government without the deprivations of
war or the failures of colonialism. By setting up a quasi-market for
repressed territories, the authors’ proposal encourages all nations to
treat their regions with dignity and respect under the law.
A Market for Sovereign Control does leave some intriguing
questions unanswered. To start, some critics have raised concerns that
the authors are a bit nonchalant about the granular details of their
proposal. What counts as a “region”? What role will international

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 804 (“[S]ome populated regions are in the ‘wrong’ countries . . . .”).
Id. at 801.
Id. at 803.
Id.
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institutions play in the scheme? How will we accurately value the
places that choose to secede? While these are certainly important
questions, small issues of practicality should not derail an innovative
idea. The law, for example, has put values on far stranger things than
sovereign territory.9 Pushing aside these second-order questions of
workability, however, reveals a deeper worry. Although Blocher and
Gulati’s proposal has great merit, the success of their plan seems to
turn on an assumption that nations will act in a rational, valuemaximizing fashion. But even a cursory review of recent history shows
that is not always the case. In particular, the authors need to consider
more fully that disputes over land are often about far more than money
and access to resources. They are about emotion, honor, revenge, and
the echoes of history. Given that, how will this proposal—based largely
on economic theory and market mechanisms—fare when confronted
with actual human institutions fueled by politics and irrational human
desires? It seems all too plausible that a repressive nation, pushed to
accept treasure in return for the loss of its land and sovereignty, may
react with anger rather than casual acceptance. If that happens, what
becomes of the peoples Blocher and Gulati seek to help? Who will
protect them? Simply changing a border does not actually remove
vulnerable minorities from the reach of their former tormentors.
Unless a committed enforcer emerges from the mists, bigger and
stronger nations will still have the power to make life hellish for any
regions that attempt to secede.
To sum up: Blocher and Gulati have proposed a sweeping vision
for the future of international law and their proposal will surely
generate important new discussions about whether private law can
better solve the problem of good governance. However, to show that
their proposal can effect significant change, the authors must gather
more evidence that offering a nation monetary compensation for land
(and peoples) has the power to bury generational disputes about who
owns contested geographies.
I. BUYING SOVEREIGNTY
A Market for Sovereign Control is exciting, audacious, and
insightful. While Blocher and Gulati’s case for selling sovereignty is not
9. Courts and state statutes routinely allow recovery for the loss of limbs, defamation, pain
and suffering, loss of consortium, invasion of privacy, and many other injuries that have no
conventional market value. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(a)(2)(i)
(LexisNexis 2013).
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without real weaknesses, they mount a formidable challenge to some
of the calcified thinking that has prevented innovation and the reform
of global institutions. In particular, they critique the failure of
international law to assist mildly oppressed peoples, propose new rules
to govern border changes, and show that international law could do
more to encourage the spread of good government.
A. The Hole in International Law
The first important contribution of A Market for Sovereign
Control is that it reveals a peculiar gap between how global institutions
treat severely oppressed places and how they treat moderately
oppressed places.10 When a country commits some brutal form of
oppression against one of its constituent regions, international bodies
generally respond with appropriate power and concern.11 In these
instances, the law recognizes the rights of the affected area to secede,
the nations of the world often intervene, and aid dollars flow to the
subjugated people.12 But what happens in the far more common
scenario where a parent nation bullies and harasses a region, but the
actions do not quite amount to genocide? The authors build a case that
international law provides no real mechanism to assist regions that are
harassed, denied equal treatment, and starved of adequate political
representation.13 The law, for example, grants them no right of
remedial secession and global armies rarely intervene to fix problems
of institutionalized discrimination.
Blocher and Gulati believe this is unjust. As they point out, there
are many people around the world who would be safer, happier, and
wealthier if surrounded by different borders and governed by different
leaders.14 But the law does nothing for them. Instead, the current

10. Id. at 803, 806–07, 814.
11. This is not to say that the international community always responds as quickly as it should
to mass atrocities. See generally SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND
THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 329–390 (2002) (arguing that America has, at best, a mixed record of
acting to stop genocide).
12. For more on remedial secession, see LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY
OF SELF-DETERMINATION 220 (1978); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical
Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 380–84 (2003).
13. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2 at 813–14; see also Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati,
Ukraine and Russia—You Break It, You Bought It, ERIC POSNER (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://ericposner.com/guest-post-ukraine-and-russia-you-break-it-you-bought-it [https://perma.
cc/83PM-T4FZ] [hereinafter Blocher & Gulati, Ukraine and Russia] (arguing that current
international law provides moderately oppressed countries “a disappointing menu of options”).
14. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 804–05.
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system leaves people from poorly governed regions to pursue self-help
remedies without the sword and shield provided by international law.
The mildly oppressed can engage in the political process, choose to
revolt against their parent countries, or attempt to find refuge in
nations that will have them. But according to Blocher and Gulati, these
self-help “solutions” to the problem of bad governance are wildly
inefficient. Despised minorities have little leverage in politics, violent
uprisings rarely succeed, and immigration, they write, “is difficult—
particularly for the poor, weak, or oppressed—and breaks up families
and communities.”15 Rather than leave these regions adrift, Blocher
and Gulati argue that global institutions should provide some
mechanism to assist communities that want greater voice in their
governance. If A Market for Sovereign Control succeeds at nothing
else, it is worth reading because of this clear-eyed insistence that more
needs to be done for people who live under misbehaving governments
and whom the law has untapped potential to help.
B. Helping International Law Help Others
Blocher and Gulati’s most important contribution is that they
articulate a paradigm shifting proposal to improve the lives of peoples
in poorly governed countries. This is a real accomplishment, in part
because international law is muddled on this point. Early in the Article,
the authors show that a tension between two foundational concepts of
international law makes it extremely difficult to excavate solutions on
behalf of the mildly oppressed.16 They explain, correctly, that the timehonored principle of territorial integrity grants nations near-absolute
control over their borders. Central governments, for example,
routinely reject boundary changes proposed by neighboring states or
internal secessionist movements.17 At the same time, however, the
increasingly relevant principle of self-determination demands that all
peoples have the opportunity to choose their own national affiliations,
govern themselves, and develop free political institutions.18 The

15. Id. at 801.
16. Id. at 799 (“The challenge is designing a framework that respects, to the degree possible,
both popular sovereignty and nations’ territorial integrity.”).
17. For example, Finland blocked the Åland Islands from becoming part of Sweden, showing
how a state may exercise its right to territorial integrity over the objections of the local people.
Steve R. Fisher, Towards “Never Again”: Searching for a Right to Remedial Secession Under
Extant International Law, 22 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 274–75 (2015).
18. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 811–13 (explaining, in broad strokes, the principle of
self-determination).
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difficulty is this: any proposal that calls for increased intervention in
repressive countries probably undermines territorial sovereignty, while
any solution that disregards the suffering in poorly treated regions
ignores the right of self-determination.
Blocher and Gulati manage to thread the needle by importing
property theory into the realm of international law. In a nutshell, their
idea is that a nation’s control over its borders should become subject
to a liability rule rather than a property rule if the nation discriminates
against one of its constituent regions.19 Under Blocher and Gulati’s
framework, a nation that denies equal treatment to a local area would
lose control over its borders; it could no longer prevent the secession
of a disaffected area. However, the authors also insist that the
government receive compensation for its lost land—compensation that
would be set by a global “market” for sovereign territory.20 Such
compensation, the authors explain, “could take a range of forms, from
lump sum financial transfers to land swaps and military and political
obligations.”21
For example, imagine that the Hmong people of northern
Thailand believe their lives would improve under a different
government. Under the current legal order, the Hmong have few
options—the national government of Thailand can quash any proposed
border change, no matter how reasonable. Blocher and Gulati argue
that this should not always be so. They contend that if Thailand has
denied the Hmong meaningful access to the government, then the
Hmong’s desire for self-determination should trump the Thais’
absolute control over the region. Under their proposal, the Hmong
region could exit Thailand with the support of the international
community, provided that it compensates the government in Bangkok
for the loss of territory.
If all this were not radical enough, Blocher and Gulati further
argue that regions have a quasi-property right to approve a sale of their
sovereignty to the highest bidder.22 Thus, the Hmong could purchase
their independence directly from Thailand, or they could solicit offers
for their sovereignty from other nation states. The authors envision
that neighboring countries like Laos, China, and Myanmar might all
lodge bids with Bangkok to bring the Hmong lands under their
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 807.
Id.
Id. at 817–18.
Id. at 818–19.

CLOWNEY IN PRINTER FINAL (TRACK CHANGES).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

2/1/2017 12:29 PM

SHOULD WE BUY SELLING SOVEREIGNTY?

25

sovereign control. To safeguard the principle of self-determination in
this framework, Blocher and Gulati suggest that a supermajority of the
voters in a transacted area endorse any final transfer.23 Thus, the
Hmong could not end up as part of a Chinese province without
significant support of voters.
It is worth pausing for a moment to admire Blocher and Gulati’s
considerable achievement. Their scheme provides overlooked and
underrepresented peoples with a new exit option. The power to leave
would endow entire regions with the opportunity to live under police
forces of their own making and courts of their choosing. Just as
importantly, Blocher and Gulati do not ignore the incentives of the
parent nation. The compensation provided by the liability rule could
work to real effect—it gives a reluctant parent nation a significant
inducement to let disgruntled regions find their own way. Why fight to
prolong a relationship that is not working for either party when there
is an opportunity to change course and reap significant financial
rewards?
Finally, it is worth pointing out explicitly that Blocher and Gulati’s
idea accomplishes all this without upsetting the broad contours of
international law. The principle of territorial integrity remains intact;
so long as a nation grants all of its people equal treatment under the
law, its borders remain secure. And, as mentioned above, the proposal
also respects the right to self-determination. No region can be pushed
toward independence or transferred to the control of a different
sovereign without its consent.
C. Spreading Good Government
Another strength of Blocher and Gulati’s proposal is that it has
the potential to improve the lives of peoples well beyond the transacted
region. Borrowing from the ideas of Charles Tiebout,24 A Market for
Sovereign Control shows that the mere threat of border changes and
interjurisdictional competition for sovereign lands would quickly
induce at least some governments to treat disfavored areas with more
respect.25 The reasoning is easy to follow. Right now, roguish nations

23. Id. at 817 (“Consistent with the principle of self-determination, the population of a
region would have the right to vote on whether to solicit, accept, or refuse governance bids from
other nations.”).
24. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418
(1956) (describing the benefits of interjurisdictional competition for citizens).
25. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 835.
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have little incentive to respond to the protests and complaints of
minority populations. As long as the parent nations’ behavior does not
tip into genocide (or some other form of severe oppression), they can
exploit and humiliate their constituent regions with few
consequences.26 An active market for sovereign control, however,
would force misbehaving nations into a difficult choice. They can either
grant new rights to previously disfavored peoples or risk losing chunks
of their territory to sovereign bidders who may win the approval of the
disaffected region.
Although this application of interjurisdictional competition in the
international context would be novel, the concept is not. The behavior
of cities, for example, has long been constrained by the ability of
residents to pick up and move to nearby suburbs.27 Detroit, for
example, cannot increase taxes unreasonably or its residents will
decide to move across the border to neighboring Dearborn, Grosse
Pointe, or Oak Park. A host of empirical studies support the basic
theory that competition between jurisdictions for residents creates a
constant pressure to design legal regimes that reflect local citizen’s
preferences.28 Thus, as long as the threat of exit remains credible and
the costs of switching between sovereigns are not prohibitive, Blocher
and Gulati’s proposal should achieve the same salubrious effects at the
international level. The authors’ idea is, in effect, a method of scaling
good government that uses market mechanisms rather than conquest
as the fulcrum for change. By pushing the most abusive nations to
abandon their worst practices, Blocher and Gulati’s scheme has the
potential to eliminate much human suffering, and that makes the idea
worth pursuing.

26. Id. at 813.
27. See Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL
AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 35 (William A. Fischel
ed., 2006) (stating that “[t]he conventional wisdom is that Tiebout sorting is most likely in a
metropolitan setting where an individual who works in the center city (or elsewhere in the area)
will have a wide choice among communities in which to live”).
28. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 521–23 (1991) (summarizing the
empirical evidence); Keith Dowding, Peter John & Stephen Biggs, Tiebout: A Survey of the
Empirical Literature, 31 URB. STUD. 767, 775–79 (1994) (surveying two-hundred articles on
empirical tests of the Tiebout hypothesis).
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II. SELLING SOVEREIGNTY
Blocher and Gulati’s Article makes many important contributions
to the current debates about international governance, refugees, and
the right of self-determination. It is an extremely valuable offering—
well-researched, well-written, thought provoking, and full of
captivating hypotheticals. But the authors’ focus on economic theory
over the gritty details of politics and human behavior may prove a
stumbling block for some readers. The easiest critique to launch at
Blocher and Gulati is that they do not discuss the specifics of their
proposal in detail.29 A Market for Sovereign Control is one of the few
modern law review articles that would benefit from more pages
devoted to legal minutiae. The authors, for example, do not flesh out
exactly what kind of oppression is sufficient to trigger their liability rule
or who will make the relevant decisions.30 Moreover, the Article also
only briefly discusses what constitutes a “region” and does not explain
how the international community would determine what compensation
is due to a parent nation in the aftermath of a secession.31
Blocher and Gulati must find answers to these practical questions
if their proposal is to move forward. Nevertheless, this review focuses
on other issues. The authors’ stated goal is not to provide model
legislation for consideration at the UN, but rather to establish a
conceptual framework to encourage more transfers of sovereign land.32
Does the piece meet this more limited goal? While Blocher and
Gulati’s scheme contains much promise, a few broad issues remain
tantalizingly unaddressed. First, the authors fail to provide a coherent
story to explain why there are not more transfers of sovereign territory
under the current international regime. Second, the authors do not
address whether a market for sovereign control is really an adequate
form of exit for regions that have been ill-treated by their parent
nation. And third, Blocher and Gulati expend little effort defending
one of their core assumptions: that nations will act as rational wealthmaximizers in a market for sovereign territory.

29. The authors openly acknowledge that their article does not provide some essential
details. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 822 (“This raises difficult questions of institutional
design and authority that this [a]rticle does not attempt to answer.”).
30. Id. at 821 (discussing the challenge of defining “what kind of oppression is sufficient to
trigger the liability rule”).
31. Id. at 840–41 (briefly discussing what counts as a “region”).
32. Id. at 804 (noting that “[a]s with any conceptual framework, we do not expect this
proposal to translate directly into practice”).
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A. Why Doesn’t a Market for Sovereignty Already Exist?
Blocher and Gulati argue that a market for sovereign land would
have the power to reduce armed conflict, improve governance, and
protect minority rights. But if swapping sovereignty for cash really
contains such promise, we should expect nations currently fighting over
territory to occasionally settle their disputes with negotiated land
transactions. Such transactions are fully sanctioned under the current
international order. While traditional law does not recognize the
liability rule put forth by Blocher and Gulati, it does permit nations to
engage in voluntary, arms-length bargaining over land.33 For example,
the United States could purchase large swaths of Canadian territory if
the governments in Washington and Ottawa could reach a mutually
agreeable price. In some respects, it is actually easier to buy and sell
land under current international law than it would be under the
framework proposed in A Market for Sovereign Control. Blocher and
Gulati, for example, would only allow transfers if residents in the
transacted region give their consent—modern international law
imposes no such restriction.34 Thus, if the Canadian government
acquiesced, the United States could make Quebec the 51st state, even
over the vociferous objections of the Québécois.
Looking at the sweep of evidence assembled in A Market for
Sovereign Control, it is difficult to conclude that countries seem eager
to sell land to their neighbors. Blocher and Gulati expend a lot of effort
demonstrating that nations flog sovereignty-like things: they confer
servitudes to one another, they lease military bases to foreign powers,
they transfer territory to foreign investors, and they engage in
cooperative efforts to build things like canals and ports.35 But these
grants of quasi-sovereignty seem markedly different than permanently
surrendering control of land and severing relationships with discrete
groups of people. In A Market for Sovereign Control, Blocher and
Gulati mention only a few examples of fulsome transfers of sovereign
territory, and the cases they rely on—the Louisiana Purchase, the sale
of the Virgin Islands, the gift of Mumbai from Portugal to Britain, the
purchase of Hong Kong—all occurred over one hundred years ago.36
This slight historical record suggests that border changes are more
33. Id. at 806–10 (showing that nations can acquire territory as they see fit, with no need for
approval from the transacted peoples).
34. Id. at 813 (declaring that “we would require regional approval for cessions”).
35. Id. at 801–02.
36. Id. at 808–09.
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fraught than the authors acknowledge. It also complicates their
argument that sales of sovereign territory will result in Pareto-efficient
outcomes. It seems that countries either find it difficult to agree on
price or, more likely, they simply resist the idea that governance can be
bought and sold.
In my view, the authors do not focus adequate attention on the
drought of negotiated transactions. How to explain the lack of transfers
under the current international order? Blocher and Gulati only
acknowledge the issue indirectly, indicating that they do not expect
their framework to get robust use. They state, “[h]opefully a market
for sovereignty can—even if rarely employed, and even if used just
once—offer a workable solution to actual problems . . . . Our goal here
is to add an option, not to ensure that nations frequently employ it.”37
But this is unsatisfying. What Blocher and Gulati propose will not be
easy to implement. By their own admission, they are pushing for a
significant addition to international law. Such schemes do not spring to
life fully formed, like Athena from the head of Zeus. The global
community will need to constitute new agencies to oversee and
administer the secessions of ill-treated regions. Committees will argue
about rules and make compromises about ambiguities. Treaties may
need to be signed. Given the time and extraordinary effort required to
erect any international framework, Blocher and Gulati have the
obligation to show that their scheme would justify the costs. Based on
the evidence presented in A Market for Sovereign Control, they have
not (yet) met that burden.
B. Exit and Enforcers
The easiest defense of A Market for Sovereign Control is that the
scheme does not solely rely on voluntary transfers. Under Blocher and
Gulati’s proposal, if a nation fails to provide representation or equal
treatment to a constituent region, it automatically loses the right to
prevent a secession and the compensation it is due can be set by an
international tribunal.38 No meeting of the minds is necessary to
effectuate a border change. But the possibility of involuntary transfers
raises a host of other, darker problems. What happens if an ill-treated
region declares independence by invoking Blocher and Gulati’s
scheme, but the parent nation refuses to accept a realignment? This is
37. Id. at 837.
38. Id. at 803 (“The parent nation . . . loses the power to forbid a cession but remains entitled
to compensation set by the market (subject to review by a third party such as the ICJ).”).
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not just academic conjecture. It is painfully easy to come up with
examples that might fall into this category: Palestinians in Israel, Kurds
in Turkey, Turks on Cyprus, Basques in France, Chechens in Russia,
Serbs in Bosnia, Ambazonians in Cameroon, and Rohingya in
Myanmar. China alone could see eruptions in Tibet, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and the Uyghur homelands.
Who, exactly, will enforce the claims of these peoples? The
international community? The purchasing nation? The regions
themselves? Blocher and Gulati do not say. A Market for Sovereign
Control would be a stronger offering if the authors sketched, in general
terms, how they envision disputed cases unfolding. Right now, it is
difficult to see how a people like the Rohingya or the Chechens can
escape their (more powerful) antagonists, at least without the backing
of a muscular enforcer.39 In fact, the only regions that seem poised to
immediately benefit from Blocher and Gulati’s scheme are the
ethnically Russian enclaves scattered throughout the former Soviet
states—they alone have a patron who can pay the mandated
compensation and then follow up with credible threats of violence if a
parent nation (Ukraine? Kazakhstan? Estonia? Georgia?) resists a
secession. Arguably, the moral force underlying Blocher and Gulati’s
proposal ebbs if their framework is perceived as a tool to consolidate
the power of rich nations rather than as a means to further the
liberation of subjugated peoples.
Even assuming that I have underestimated the number of regions
that can initially extricate themselves from the grip of discriminatory
central governments, Blocher and Gulati’s framework may still hit a
few speedbumps. The success of the authors’ proposal turns on the
ability to provide regions with a genuine exit option.40 But altering a
border does not physically remove vulnerable populations from the
reach of their former tormentors. Establishing an invisible boundary
between tyrant and the terrorized, without more, accomplishes little.
Consider two examples. First, in 2011, the black population of Sudan
overwhelmingly voted to break free from its oppressive central

39. For a primer on the Rohingya, see generally Maung Zarni & Alice Cowley, The SlowBurning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 683 (2014). And for
background on the Chechens, see generally Johanna Nichols, The Chechen Refugees, 18
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 241 (2000).
40. Tiebout models of intra-jurisdictional competition rest on the ability of citizens to reveal
their preferences through exit. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 419 (1990) (stating that exit is “pivotal to the efficiency of
Tiebout’s system”).
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government and form its own nation, South Sudan.41 The international
community affirmed this vote and drew new borders upon the map.42
The government of Sudan, however, has sporadically ignored the
border change; it continues to harass the South Sudanese people and
meddle in the affairs of the new nation.43 Life for the South Sudanese
hardly seems to have improved in the aftermath of independence.44
Second, in 1999, the people of East Timor voted for independence from
Indonesia, only for an Indonesian-backed militia to initiate a campaign
of terror.45 The newly liberated region was saved only when the world
community intervened and the UN assumed administration of the
region.46 In this small, Connecticut-sized nation, the peacekeeping
mission lasted over a decade.47 Is this the template that A Market for
Sovereign Control envisions?
Blocher and Gulati might respond that although their proposal is
not perfect, “[t]he availability of a market solution gives [a] region an
exit option it did not have before[.]”48 No one is worse off and the
scheme may occasionally help a marginalized people achieve greater

41. See Maggie Fick, South Sudan: 5 Key Questions Answered, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (July 21, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0721/South-Sudan-5key-questions-answered/Why-did-the-Republic-of-South-Sudan-secede-from-the-North [https://
perma.cc/JC88-E5TF] (describing the Sudanese government’s consistent marginalization of the
non-Arab South).
42. Jeffrey Gettleman, Struggle Over, Independent South Sudan Rejoices, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 2011, at A6 (discussing the involvement of the United States in crafting the treaty between
North and South Sudan).
43. See Hannibal Travis, Genocide, Counterinsurgency, and the Self-Defense of UN Member
States Before the International Criminal Court, 22 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 139, 194–97
(2016); Charlton Doki & Dam Mohamed, “Africa’s Arms Dump”: Following the Trail of Bullets
in the Sudans, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/02/-spafrica-arms-dump-south-sudan [https://perma.cc/TVB4-VK92] (discussing reports that the
Sudanese government supplies arms to rebels fighting in South Sudan). The South Sudanese have
been no angels in this dispute. Many observers hold them largely responsible for the 2012 crisis
in Heglig.
44. See generally Harjot Dhillon, Lofty Goals in Dire Times: South Sudan’s Obstacles to
Achieving the New SDGs, 16 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 14, 14 (2016) (discussing the political
and humanitarian challenges in South Sudan).
45. Cheah Wui Ling, Forgiveness and Punishment in Post-Conflict Timor, 10 UCLA J. INT’L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 297, 304–07 (2005) (describing the violence in the immediate aftermath of
East Timor’s independence vote).
46. Id. at 305–06.
47. See UNMIT: The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UNITED NATIONS
(Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit [https://perma.cc/6E2HDH9N] (“The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste completed its mandate on 31
December 2012.”).
48. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 825.
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security. And yet, there is a nontrivial danger that their proposal could
spark increased levels of armed conflict around the globe. It does not
take much imagination to envision a world where an ill-treated people,
whose cause is suddenly injected with the righteousness of
international law, might decide to initiate violence against the central
government that refuses to allow secession. Blocher and Gulati’s
framework may also draw outside enforcers into what had been
regional tensions, thereby risking the spread of new conflicts with
different peoples and providing a spark for the enlargement of
disputes.49 I do not believe this critique poses a fundamental challenge
to Blocher and Gulati’s proposal. It does, however, bring onscreen
some downside risks of the framework that the authors might consider
in their future writings.
C. Politics and Psychology
Blocher and Gulati are correct, in my view, to worry that regions
denied representation by their parent countries need better exit
options. In A Market for Sovereign Control, the authors ably use the
tools of markets and economic theory to disrupt current thinking about
self-determination, the inviolability of borders, and how best to protect
disfavored minority groups. The discussion, however, would have been
enriched with a sober focus on international politics and the
psychology that accompanies questions of sovereign territory.
Specifically, Blocher and Gulati’s market-based proposal assumes that
nations are rational actors who seek to maximize their economic
welfare above other goals. They maintain that parent countries will
quickly snap up compensation for lost land rather than fight over
troublesome regions that desire to join another sovereign. This view of
international affairs seems incomplete. While nations certainly
respond to monetary incentives, they also sit atop the fault lines of
history, honor, and vengeance.
The most obvious complication for Blocher and Gulati’s market is
that sovereign territory is not a fungible good that can be easily
replaced. Specific places and landscapes continue to play a hugely
significant part in the construction of national identities.50 For example,

49. See Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property
Rights, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 104–07 (discussing the danger of enforcing one’s own
entitlements).
50. Blocher and Gulati make a glancing reference to this issue. See Blocher & Gulati, supra
note 2, at 815.
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it’s difficult to conceive of the United States ever assenting to a sale of
the Statue of Liberty or Independence Hall, even if the surrounding
areas become inhabited by some ungovernable minority. These sites
are too rich with symbolic meaning to relinquish for money, access to
military bases, or promises to open new markets. “Ordinary”
landscapes, too, are often seen as integral to the national identity.51 For
example, idyllic versions of the Western United States and the small
New England town have, in different contexts, come to symbolize the
wider nation. This is true all around the globe. In versions of Welsh
nationalist discourse, for example, “the mountains are seen as the heart
of the nation, somehow symbolizing a Wales untainted by outside . . .
influences.”52 And in England, images of the rural landscape reinforce
ideas about English history and its collective character.53 That territory
remains so interlaced with the construction of national identity casts
some dark shadows across Blocher and Gulati’s optimistic vision for a
market in sovereign territory. In a world where altering boundaries is
often akin to a betrayal of a people’s history, offering monetary
compensation for land loss might not provide as strong an incentive as
Blocher and Gulati hope.54 What politician will accept thirty pieces of
silver to sanction the loss of territory where national heroes lived,
battles were won, and prophets lay buried?
Visions of national honor may also have a warping effect on
Blocher and Gulati’s proposal. Recall the recent troubles in Crimea.
The authors have argued that their proposal would have improved
outcomes in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine.55 Under the
current legal regime, Russia had every incentive to manufacture unrest
in Crimea and then use the resulting chaos to justify a “humanitarian”
military intervention to protect the region’s Russian population.
According to Blocher and Gulati, a market would have given Russia a
different and better alternative.56 The Russians could have directed
their military spending toward a compensation package, which could

51. See David Storey, Territory and National Identity: Examples from the Former Yugoslavia,
87 GEOGRAPHY 108, 109–10 (2002).
52. Id. at 110.
53. See MICHAEL BUNCE, THE COUNTRYSIDE IDEAL: ANGLO-AMERICAN IMAGES OF
LANDSCAPE 33–34 (1994).
54. Storey, supra note 51, at 113 (arguing that for Serbs, relinquishing claims to Kosovo is a
“betrayal of their own history”).
55. Blocher & Gulati, Ukraine and Russia, supra note 13.
56. Id.
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have led to “a voluntary and more legitimate cession.”57 But this vision
assumes too much. It presumes a Ukrainian politician could accept
money from Russia for Ukrainian land without incurring the rage of
the people.58 And it imagines that Russia’s only motivation was to
control the resources of Crimea. Many observers have argued,
however, that Russia’s behavior was not driven primarily by economic
considerations.59 Rather, the point of the Crimea excursion was to
humiliate the West and punish Ukrainians for electing a pro-European
government.60 These goals could not have been accomplished through
a negotiated purchase.
The most basic problem is this: Blocher and Gulati’s proposal
allows sales of sovereign land, but it does not make it particularly
honorable or politically feasible to do so. This hitch is not
insurmountable, but it requires changing some very sticky norms.
Consider the ongoing conflict between Britain and Argentina over the
Falkland Islands. Britain spends enormous sums of money each year to
defend the Falklands, a group of islands in the South Atlantic Ocean,
almost eight thousand miles away from London.61 Argentina
desperately wants to govern the archipelago, which sits off its coast and
is still home to three thousand people.62 Reason dictates that Britain
should buy out the inhabitants and sell the territory to Argentina (or
purchase Argentina’s claim). And yet this seems an impossibility. For
the British public, the Falklands are the site of a rousing British military
57. Id.
58. See Issac Chotiner, How Putin Won Crimea, and Lost Ukraine, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2016,
9:15 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2016/10/tim_judah_on_
how_putin_won_crimea_and_lost_ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/U3WD-22LZ] (discussing how
the invasion of Crimea turned “millions” of Ukrainians against Russia).
59. See, e.g., Daniel Treisman, Why Putin Took Crimea, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2016, at
47, 48 (discussing Putin’s many motivations for the invasion); Leonid Bershidsky, Why Russia
Stopped at Crimea, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 22, 2016, 12:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/view/articles/2016-02-22/why-russia-stopped-at-crimea [https://perma.cc/PB9C-8TB5] (“In
Ukraine, [Putin] wants to cripple the country enough that the West will be wary of taking it in,
integrating it into European institutions.”).
60. See Nina Khrushcheva, What Does Vladimir Putin Really Want in Ukraine?, REUTERS
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/02/01/what-does-vladimir-putin-reallywant-in-ukraine [https://perma.cc/85FV-MKEW] (“Some political analysts assert that Putin is all
about asymmetrical retaliation: Every time he feels his power is disrespected, he lashes out.”).
61. Adam Taylor, The UK’s Defense of the Falkland Islands Costs a Staggering Amount
Per Islander, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 14, 2012, 8:45 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/falklandislands-cost-2012-2 [https://perma.cc/8AMY-KLUJ].
62. Steven Swinford, Theresa May Extends Olive Branch to Argentina Over Falkland Islands,
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2016, 1:22 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/11/theresamay-asks-argentina-to-discuss-falklands-flights-and-oil [https://perma.cc/FZ9E-ZBGY].
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victory and stand as a symbol of martial courage and national pride.63
Moreover, the ability to defend such a far-flung place demonstrates
British national greatness to the world and serves as a reminder of the
country’s former imperial reach.64 To sell the Falklands is to sell off
British history and leave behind the graves of British soldiers who died
defending the island. All of this should depress supporters of Blocher
and Gulati’s scheme. If two wealthy Western countries (that share
many of the same values) cannot agree to sell a group of islands that
has no strategic significance and only contains a handful of settlements,
it demonstrates how much work still needs to be done.
CONCLUSION
In A Market for Sovereign Control, Joseph Blocher and Mitu
Gulati have accomplished something rare and vitally important. For
the better part of the past century, international law has assumed that
borders are inviolable, except in the most extreme cases. Blocher and
Gulati disrupt this thinking by proposing to protect international
boundaries with a liability rule rather than a property rule. Their case
against the sanctity of borders is a powerful one, and they convincingly
argue that where the people of a region are clearly denied equal rights
they should have the ability to exit, provided they compensate their
parent nation. Blocher and Gulati deserve plaudits because they are
pushing for a way to bring functioning government to oppressed
people, rather than forcing oppressed people to flee their homes in
search of security.
Unfortunately, the devil is in the details. And, right now, Blocher
and Gulati’s alternative vision lacks concrete details in crucial areas. In
other places, their framework borrows too heavily from law and
economics concepts at the expense of more granular thinking about onthe-ground political realities. Will the threat of a market for
sovereignty really inspire rogues to treat disfavored regions with a
lighter touch? Will bigger, stronger nations (China, Russia, the United
States) really accede to any limits on their sovereignty? Is there any
good evidence that offering monetary compensation for land can bury
generations-long disputes about who owns contested territories?
Against this background, perhaps the greatest virtue of Blocher and
Gulati’s framework is that it might spark important debates between
63. WENDY WEBSTER, ENGLISHNESS AND EMPIRE 1939–1965, at 219–20 (2005) (discussing
Margaret Thatcher and the memory of the Falklands War).
64. Id.
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nations, shift norms about borders, and make transactions for
sovereign territory more politically palatable.

